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extension of liability is further supported by the consideration that the used car dealer
is such an essential unit in the system of merchandising automobiles that without the
used car turnover, the volume of new car sales would be smaller. At the same time,
the secondhand car business under the prevalent trade-in arrangement owes its
existence mainly to the sales of new cars. Thus it should share the overhead costs of
distribution with the manufacturer and other dealers and should be no more immune
than they from the obligation to deliver cars free from defects. This is especially true
in view of the fact that the duty of manufacturers, dealers and repairmen to eliminate discoverable defects arises from the foreseeability of possible harm to third persons if they do not remedy the defects-a foreseeability of harm no more apparent in
their case than in that of a used car dealer. This solution, however, may be unpopular
because of a fear that the secondhand dealers will be unable to carry this additional
burden.2 But a slight rise in prices calculated on the basis of an increase in costs caused
by insurance against the additional liability would be all that is necessary. This slight
trade disadvantage would be negligible compared with the protection thus afforded to
the public.

Wills-Implied Revocation-Remarriage by Testatrix-[Nevada].-The probate
of a testamentary instrument executed by a married woman, who was later divorced
and remarried, was contested by her second husband. The instrument, which was
never explicitly revoked, originally provided for the decedent's two minor children
and her first husband, but by codicil the bequest to the first spouse was revoked two
months before the divorce. At the time of the testatrix's death, two months after the
second marriage, no provision had been made by her for the second husband. On appeal from the decree of the district court admitting the instrument to probate, held,
the will made by a married woman is not revoked by a subsequent marriage of the
woman to another man. judgment affirmed. In re Walters' Estate.,
Application of the doctrine of implied revocation raises two questions. First, does
the doctrine express the general principle that any change in domestic relations operates as a revocation, especially if new duties arise, or is its application limited to a
few, narrowly defined situations? Second, since the legislature has acted to remove the
usually alleged reason for the rule that marriage revokes the testamentary instrument
of a woman, namely, the testamentary incapacity of married women, has the rule
likewise ceased to exist?
There were two reasons given at common law for the revocation of a woman's will
theory. It might be methodically correct to exclude the bystander from the regulations of a
"Sales" Act, but this proceeding may easily lead to an argument from the contrary denying
liability even under a tort theory. Section 28(2) defines the manufacturer as a "person who
processes or assembles goods which he thereafter markets for ultimate use in consumption."
It might be advisable expressly to include the secondhand dealer.
2x As to the similar fear of discouragement of enterprise which would be caused by an exextension of liability, see Labatt, Negligence in Relation to Privity of Contract, 6 L. Q. Rev.
i68 (19oo).
1104 P. (2d) 968 (Nev. S. Ct. 1940). The husband was totally excluded from testatrix's
estate unless mentioned in the will since Nevada law provides for neither estate by curtesy nor
a statutory share. Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, X929) §§ 3361, 99o6.

RECENT CASES
upon marriage. The rule usually cited was the doctrine of implied revocation by
change of circumstances, explained upon the consideration that a person is presumed
to revoke his will in the event of important changes in his family status. 2 The other
reason for revocation was that upon marriage a woman lost her legal personality3 and
became, therefore, incapable of making or having a will.4
The doctrine of implied revocation is explained by a presumption of change in intent, hence it is not favoreds since it confuses the actual intent of the individual testator
with the presumed intent of testators in general. 6 It has been occasionally held that
any change in circumstances which would create new moral duties would revoke a
prior will.7 In states where the statutes provide for or have been construed to allow
revocation by implication, it has been held that a divorce accompanied by a property
settlement constitutes such a change in circumstances as to revoke a testamentary
instrument.8 With possibly one exception,9 however, there are no American cases,
which in the absence of statutory provisions,"* have held that a divorce alone will revoke a will."
Adjudicated cases,' 2 on the question of whether the second marriage of a testatrix
X
revokes an instrument executed during a previous marriage have, with one exception, 3
held that the instrument is not revoked by implication. Some of these cases involved
statutes similar to that in the principal case, which enactment provides that the will
24 Kent, Comm. *521.
4

3 x Schouler, Wills 732 (6th ed. z923).
Atkinson, Wills § 72 (1937); 2 B. Comm. *497-99.

s See, e.g., In re Adler's Estate, 52 Wash. 539, oo Pac. ioi9 (igog).
6 "Every material addition to the property of a testator, or alteration in the circumstances
of his family, varies his relations and duties, either in kind or degree, and might be made the
ground of very plausible and pathetic claims upon the Court for the application of this doctrine of a presumed revocation. Courts would be running the hazard of substituting their will
for that of the testator." Brush v. Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 506, 519 (1820).
Morgan v. Ireland, i Idaho 786 (i88o) (will of husband made during the first marriage
deemed revoked by subsequent marriage); Young's Appeal, 39 Pa. 115 (i86i) (antenuptial
will of woman deemed revoked by birth of unmentioned son). But see Jones's Estate, 2x1 Pa.
364, 385, 6o Atl. 915, 923 (195o).
8
Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. i6, 54 N.W. 699 (i893); Donaldson v. Hall, io6 Minn. 502,
ii9 N.W. 219 (19o9).
9 In re McGraw's Estate, 228 Mich. 1, 7, i99 N.W. 686, 688 (x924). See note by Puttkammer, 21 Ill. L. Rev. 282 (1926).
10 Minnesota and Washington are the only states which have provided for revocation of a
will by divorce as to the provisions in favor of the divorced spouse. Minn. Stat. (Mason,
1927) §§ 8741, 8742, and Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1399.

"xSee 25 A.L.R. 49 (1923); 37 A.L.R. 312 (1925); 42 A.L.R. 1289 (1926); Evans, Testamentary Revocation by Divorce, 24 Ky. L.J. i (1935).
2 Decided under statutes similar to that involved in the instant case are: In re Burton's
Will, 4 Misc. 512, 25 N.Y. Supp. 824 (x893); In re Comassi's Estate, 107 Cal. i, 40 Pac. 15
(x895); Hibberd v. Trask, x6o Ind. 498, 67 N.E. 179 (1903); In re McLarney's Estate, 153
N.Y. 416, 47 N.E. 817 (z897); In re Lufkin's Estate, 32 Hawaii 826 (i933); d. Chapman v.
Dismer, 14 App. D.C. 446 (1899); In re Ward, 70 Wis. 251, 35 N.W. 731 (z887); In re Van
Guelpen's Estate, 87 Wash. 146, 15, Pac. 245 (1915).
X3 In re Van Guelpen's Estate, 87 Wash. x46, i5i Pac. 245 (1915).
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of an unmarried woman shall be revoked by her subsequent marriage.X4 Simply upon
the basis of the text of the statute it was held that the will of a married woman is
not revoked by a subsequent marriage.s In addition some of the adjudicated cases
have held that statutory enactments giving a married woman full power to hold and to
dispose of property have rendered the common law rule of revocation of a woman's
6
will ineffective
The doctrine of implied revocation, limited as it is to the common law applications,

is not broad enough to cover the modem domestic situations which occur as a result
of divorce and remarriage. The only argument that can be advanced to substantiate
limiting the application of the implied revocation doctrine to a first marriage is an
historical one. 7 As the result of common acceptance of divorce and remarriage by
contemporary society, the legislatures of some states have broadened the doctrine of
implied revocation to include the circumstances of divorce 8 and all marriages.9
If Nevada were still operating under the common law, the will of the testatrix
would have been revoked."° The application of a statute providing for revocation of
an unmarried woman's will by marriage and the lack of adaptability of the commonlaw rules to the instant situation required the court to admit the instrument to probate, although it is evident that in the absence of statutory provisions excluding the
wills of married women from revocation by marriage, the court would have preferred
to do otherwise.-1 The question of whether a divorce or a subsequent or second mar2
riage, or both, should operate as a revocation of a will is for the legislature. 2
'4 "A will executed by an unmarried woman shall be deemed revoked on her subsequent
marriage ..... " Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) § 9915.
XSCf. In re Lufkin's Estate, 32 Hawaii 826 (1933); Virginia & T. R. Co. v. Elliott, 5 Nev.

358, 364 (,870).
x6 Kelly v.

Stevenson, 85 Minn. 247, 249, 88 N.W. 739, 740 (1902).
X7The ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over will contests, and neither the canon law
nor the English common law recognized divorce. i Page, Wills § 521 (2d ed. 1928); Rogers,
Ecclesiastical Law 323 et seq. (184o).
8 Note

xii supra.

'9Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1940) c. 3, § 46: " ... Marriage by the testator shall
revoke any existing will executed by the testator prior to the date of the marriage." Cf. McJunkin v. Moody, 9 S.E. (2d) 209 (S.C. 1940), decided under a comparable statute andholding
that the will of a male testator was revoked by remarriage.
2" Note 4 supra and accompanying text.
2" In re Walters' Estate, 104 P. (2d) 968, 974 (Nev. 1940).
2 In re Lufkin's Estate, 32 Hawaii 826 (1933), was decided under a statute which provided that the will of an unmarried woman shall be deemed revoked on her subsequent marriage. Hawaii Rev. Laws (1925) § 3326. While the case was pending in the supreme court the
legislature amended the statute to provide that a will executed by any woman shall be deemed
revoked upon her thereafter entering into marriage. Hawaii Rev. Laws (i935) §4920.

